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As technology becomes more embedded in society, customer 
expectations of both the cost and quality of services have changed 
dramatically. While the legal industry has historically been 
resistant to such innovation, mounting pressure to lower costs is 
driving legal professionals to increasingly leverage the benefits of 
technology.1 With a focus on lowering the cost of legal services, 
very few commentators have expressed concern about maintaining 
or improving the quality of legal services.2 In a recent academic 
work, however, prominent legal scholar George Triantis explores 
the question of whether law firms can simultaneously improve 
legal contract quality while reducing the costs of creating  
such.3 Triantis argues that improving contract quality, rather than  
simply reducing cost, will help lawyers more effectively respond  
to economic pressures and changing technologies.4 Triantis 
outlines several barriers to innovation that exist within the  
legal industry and explains how limited intellectual property rights 
are especially cumbersome to the effort.5 Without intellectual 
property protection, Triantis posits that law firms can best 
incentivize contract development and overcome barriers to 
 
 1. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 798; see also RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 28–33 (2008) 
(describing the path from bespoke legal practice to commoditized services). 
 2. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S 
SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH (2003). According to Clayton 
Christensen’s model, cost-cutting mechanisms regarding document production are 
considered disruptions and are likely to result in broadening access to legal services. Law 
firms, however, appear to be underinvesting in innovations that would increase quality due 
to structural obstacles and the absence of a methodology for valuing transactional legal 
services. See id. 
 3. See George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and 
Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177 (2013). 
 4. Id. at 179–80; see also Triantis, Taking Goldston Chair, Looks at Emerging Threats to 
Transactional Legal Practice, HARVARD LAW TODAY (Feb. 28, 2008), https://today.law. 
harvard.edu/triantis-taking-goldston-chair-looks-at-emerging-threats-to-transactional-
legal-practice/?redirect=1. 
 5. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 194–97, 195 n.40 (“There appear to be no valid grounds 
why legal forms such as contracts, insurance policies, pleadings, and other legal documents 
should not be protected under the law of copyright.” (quoting 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18)); Gerald F. Davis & Heinrich R. Greve, 
Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM J. SOC. 1, 2–3 fig.1 (1997). 
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innovation through collaborative contract design strategies like 
standardization and modularity.6 
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Note considers whether alternative means exist to 
incentivize contract innovation in the marketplace, even in the 
absence of intellectual property rights. More specifically, the 
following analysis evaluates whether smart contract and 
blockchain technology can incentivize contract innovation. The 
research is designed to assist business lawyers and executives 
looking to leverage these technologies and is organized as follows. 
Part III provides a brief overview of the business model of 
transactional legal services, economic pressures facing the 
industry, and barriers to contract innovation. The section then 
reviews George Triantis’ recent academic work, in which he argues 
that improving contract quality through collaborative design best 
positions legal professionals to overcome barriers to innovation 
within the industry, despite increased pressure to reduce costs. Part 
IV provides a foundational background to smart contracts and 
distributed ledger technology (DLT). The Part then examines the 
benefits and drawbacks of each to illustrate the legal industry’s 
reluctance to adopt the technology to assist contract development 
and improvement. Part V hypothesizes that commercial entities 
leveraging smart contract and distributed ledger technology may 
be in a stronger position than law firms to capture financial returns 
from contract innovation—effectively reducing a party’s reliance 
upon transactional lawyers to create contracts—since their business 
models inherently insulate returns from competitors and eliminate 
many of the traditional barriers to innovation found in the legal 
industry. Part VI illustrates this alternative method for contract 
innovation through a case study featuring IBM and its effort to 
leverage smart contracts and distributed ledger technology 
through the IBM Watson IoT Platform and Blockchain. Part VII 
considers the impact such technology is having on the marketplace 
 
 6. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 202–04; see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The 
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract 
Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 286–89 (1985). 
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and whether proprietary contract platforms, like the IBM Watson 
IoT Platform and Blockchain, promote or inhibit consumer welfare. 
III. BARRIERS TO CONTRACT INNOVATION 
At the heart of business dealings is the natural language 
agreement—an agreement with specific terms between two or 
more persons or entities in which there is a promise to do or refrain 
from doing something in return for a benefit of value, known as 
consideration.7 Such agreements are the traditional way to 
formalize a business relationship and serve as “the basic building 
block of [the] market economy.”8 The primary role of transactional 
lawyers is to facilitate secure transfers of assets and allocations of 
risk through the creation and enforcement of these agreements.9 In 
a recent academic work, George Triantis outlines the value these 
lawyers provide in contractual dealings and discusses the 
innovations acting upon the transactional legal practice.10 
A. Stages of Contract Development 
More specifically, Triantis observes that lawyers service clients 
across three distinct contracting stages, which he classifies as: 
“front-end, midstream, and back-end.”11 During the front-end 
stage of contracting, lawyers “design, draft, and negotiate” 
contracts.12 Most frequently, lawyers utilize standard contract 
terms not only to reduce the costs of contract development13 but 
 
 7. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 183. 
 8. Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST 
MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://www.ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469. 
 9. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183–84. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 183; see also George Triantis, James Kowal & Patricia Kowal, Disruption and 
Innovation in Transactional Law Practice, STANFORD LAWYER (Nov. 11, 2013), https://law. 
stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/disruption-and-%E2%80%A8innovation-in-
transactional-law-practice/. 
 12. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183. 
 13. A departure from standardized contract terms may increase attorney reading 
costs. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608, 646–47 (1998); Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs 
of Form Contracts, 167 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 30, 39 (2011). 
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also to increase the value of terms through network effects.14 
Alternatively, lawyers may customize terms to the specific needs of 
their clients or even create innovative terms that improve contract 
quality.15 Triantis makes an important distinction, however, 
between customization and innovation of contract terms. He 
defines customization as the “one-time tailoring of a contract term 
to a specific transaction and client.”16 Only in rare cases is such 
customization or innovation a cost-effective approach to 
transacting.17 Thus, lawyers should consider the high costs often 
associated with departure from a standardized term relative to the 
mere incremental value of including a more customized term.18 
Innovation, on the other hand, is defined as the “creation of a new 
term that can be redeployed in other transactions and potentially 
standardized.”19 Thus, innovation refers to improvements to 
contracts that are more significant in degree than customization.20 
Once a contract is finalized, the midstream stage begins, during 
which each party is expected to perform their respective promises 
according to the terms of the contract.21 Exact and complete 
performance by both parties discharges the contract and relieves 
parties from further legal obligations. To avoid inadvertent 
breaches or performance beyond the contract requirements, parties 
to the transaction must remain aware of and integrate the terms of 
the contract into their business practices.22 Contract obligations are 
frequently overlooked and unwittingly modified during this stage, 
which demands active monitoring and management of the contract 
 
 14. Triantis, supra note 3, at 180–81; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 286–92; 
Henry Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of 
Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 159 (1989); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization 
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 
719–27 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 757, 782–88 (1995). 
 15. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183–84. 
 16. Id. at 192. 
 17. Id. at 183–84; see also THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 89–
91, 114 (2010); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2189, 2204 (2007). 
 18. Triantis, supra note 3, at 183–84. 
 19. Id. at 192. 
 20. Id. at 184. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.; see also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 101, 109–15 (2006). 
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to ensure proper performance.23 Active contract management is 
especially important for business entities that maintain a high 
number of contractual relationships with multiple parties.24  
The back-end stage of contracting occurs after a contract is 
terminated or breached. If a breach or other contract dispute  
arises, lawyers intervene on behalf of their clients through various 
tools of legal action (e.g., arbitration, mediation, litigation, 
settlement negotiations).25 
B. Pressure on the Legal Industry to Reduce Costs 
Across these stages of contract development, the legal  
industry continues to face tremendous pressure to reduce costs.26 
Many clients are seeking more cost-efficient services27 and are 
opting to disaggregate their expensive legal needs across a  
variety of providers in the effort.28 Other clients are allocating 
certain components of transactional work to non-lawyer  
providers since doing so often results in even more significant  
cost savings.29 Legal professionals have responded to these 
pressures by focusing time and attention almost exclusively on cost 
reduction through methods like increased standardization and 
document automation.30 
 
 23. Triantis, supra note 3, at 184. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 201; see also THOMAS J. DELONG, JOHN J. GABARRO & ROBERT J. LEES, WHEN 
PROFESSIONALS HAVE TO LEAD: A NEW MODEL FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE 90–93 (2007); DAVID 
H. MAISTER, MANAGING THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRM 4 (1993); Ashish Nanda, Strategy 
and Positioning in Professional Service Firms, HARV. BUS. SCH. Case Study No. 9-904-060, 6–10 
(2004); Mark A. Cohen, The Legal Industry Needs Fresh Leadership with New Skill Sets, FORBES 
(Sept. 18, 2017, 06:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/09/18/the-
legal-industry-needs-fresh-leadership-with-new-skill-sets/#3323575c67d7. 
 27. Many legal tasks once performed solely by attorneys are being outsourced to more 
cost-effective legal service providers, automated through technology solutions, swallowed 
by in-house corporate legal departments, or made available for free to low-revenue clients 
in hopes of eventually transitioning them to a paid client at a later date (e.g., Cooley LLP’s 
launch of the CooleyGo platform—a mobile-friendly microsite that provides a range of free 
legal and business content to start-ups with formation, financing, team building, intellectual 
property, M&A, etc.). Cohen, supra note 26; COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/ (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2020). Not surprisingly, purchasers of legal services—not law firms 
themselves—are driving this industry change. Cohen, supra note 26. 
 28. Triantis, supra note 3, at 201. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 192. 
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As professional services, like contract development, become 
more standardized—meaning, they are “simple enough to be used 
by individuals with relatively little training and the procedures 
themselves can be sold to end users as commodities”—the services 
naturally drift toward cheaper and less prestigious market sectors, 
effectively becoming commoditized.31 In other words, successfully 
reducing costs through standardization often results in greater 
commoditization of law firm services.32 Clients subsequently 
become accustomed to paying for less expensive commoditized 
offerings and, in turn, question the value of returning to a higher 
price point.33 With such inexpensive commoditized services 
available, law firms face an increased challenge of persuading 
clients of the value of customized or “premium” legal services.34 
Despite this emphasis this emphasis on lowering the costs of 
transactional legal services, few have expressed concern about 
maintaining or improving the quality of contracts through 
innovation.35 Triantis is one of a few academics raising this issue. 
He argues that developing new ways to improve the quality of 
transactional services will help lawyers redesign their business 
models to more effectively respond to industry pressures and 
emerging technologies.36 While innovation37 is central to improving 
the quality of contracts, Triantis maintains that several barriers 
impede such innovation in the legal industry.38 These barriers 
include the customary deployment of standardized contract terms 
 
 31. Id. at 201; see also What the Future Legal Market Means for Lawyers and Bar 
Associations, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_ 
leader/2012_13/july_august/what_future_legal_market_means_lawyers_bar_ 
associations/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
 32. Triantis, supra note 3, at 185; see also Nanda, supra note 26, at 6–10; Thomson 
Reuters, Don’t Be Commoditized: How to Rise to the Top as the Competition Races to the Bottom, 
ATTORNEY AT WORK (July 20, 2018), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/lawyers-dont-be-
commoditized/. 
 33. Triantis, supra note 3, at 202. 
 34. Id.; see also Russ Alan Prince, How Law Firms Can Overcome the Commoditization 
Crisis in Legal Services, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
russalanprince/2017/11/28/how-law-firms-can-overcome-the-commoditization-crisis-in-
legal-services/#7acbb26d10a1. 
 35. Triantis, supra note 3, at 192. 
 36. Id. at 179–80. 
 37. Triantis defines innovation as “the creation of a new [legal] term that can be 
redeployed in other transactions and potentially standardized.” Id. at 192. 
 38. Id. at 180. 
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without change,39 the limited intellectual property protection 
available to drafters of novel contract language,40 market resistance 
to the adoption of novel terms,41 and structural features of legal 
entities that value client service over innovation, etc.42  
C. Standardization of Contract Terms 
A primary barrier to contract innovation is the tension between 
capturing the benefits associated with deploying standardized 
contract terms and encouraging their improvement.43 Contracts 
and their embedded terms are rarely, if ever, created from scratch.44 
Both law firms and individual lawyers often store documents from 
prior transactions and subsequently reuse developed contract 
provisions as a perceived procedural best practice.45 Such 
standardization has “a long tradition in transactional legal 
practice” and provides a range of benefits, including efficiency, cost 
reduction, simplified negotiations with opposing parties, and a 
lower risk of undesirable judicial interpretation.46 Standardization 
is often supported by a similar transactional technique known as 
contract modularity. Modularity refers to the ability of components 
within a system to be separated or combined without 
compromising the completeness of the rest of the system.47 In other 
words, contracts are “modular to the degree that their parts can be 
drafted and read without adjustment or reference to other parts of 
 
 39. Id. at 192. 
 40. Id. at 195. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 186. 
 43. Id. at 184; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 286–92. 
 44. Triantis, supra note 3, at 186. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. A classic study of modularity is 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN 
RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 63 (2000) (defining modularity). The modularity of 
contracts has been observed by several scholars. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Language, 
Deals, and Standards: The Future of XML Contracts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 324 (2006); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2006) (“Boilerplate can be used not just for standardization but, 
because terms can be used as building blocks, for customization.”); Henry E. Smith, 
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006) 
(“[A]djustment can happen within modules without causing major ripple effects”). 
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the contract.”48 Modularity often reduces transactional costs 
because it allows a firm to divide contracts into individual 
components and allocate those components to various attorneys—
many of whom are junior associates with lower billing rates—
which facilitates independent and simultaneous drafting of 
components that will ultimately be combined into one final 
contract.49 Junior associates, for example, will often complete the 
majority of the initial legal drafting, with more senior attorneys 
providing guidance and supervision along the way.50 
 Standardization and modularity offer a number of benefits, 
such as the ability to reduce overall costs through knowledge 
sharing.51 Effective standardization fundamentally relies on a law 
firm’s redeployment of contract terms across its transactions as well 
as the sharing of those terms with other firms.52 In doing so, the 
standard contract term gains widespread adoption, which benefits 
all parties in the industry utilizing the term. While the firm drafting 
the term captures economies of scale53 by applying it to multiple 
transactions, the non-drafting party benefits in that a standard term 
is easier to read and understand. This allows the non-drafting party 
to more quickly process the familiar term, which reduces reading 
costs and simplifies negotiations over contract language to the 
benefit of both parties.54 The tradition of knowledge sharing  
within and across law firms advances this mutually beneficial 
 
 48. Triantis, supra note 3, at 191. 
 49. Id. at 202. “Developing even a simple form requires several hours of attorney time 
at multiple levels of the organization (i.e., junior associate level, partner level, and practice 
group leader level).” Patrick Dundas, Legal Document Drafting – Tools and Practices That 
Enhance a Firm’s Competitive Edge, in LAW FIRM KM: DRIVING PRACTICE INNOVATION AND 
REDEFINING SERVICE DELIVERY 39, 54 (Laura Slater ed., 2016).  
 50. Kenneth A. Adams, Law Firms and Contract Drafting: A Panel Discussion at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, ADAMS ON CONT. DRAFTING 1, 1–2 (Mar. 8, 2009), 
https://www.adamsdrafting.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Penn-Law-Panel-
Discussion-3.8.09.pdf. 
 51. Triantis, supra note 3, at 187. 
 52. Id. 
 53. “An economy of scale is achieved when increasing the scale of production 
decreases long-term average costs. In other words, the cost of production per unit decreases 
as a company produces more units. Reducing the cost per unit of production is the most 
significant advantage created by economies of scale.” Prateek Agarwal, Economies of Scale, 
INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST, https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/economies-of-scale/ (last 
updated Apr. 11, 2019). 
 54. Triantis, supra note 3, at 186. 
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process, enabling significant time and cost savings at all three 
stages of the contracting process.55 Accordingly, firms are strongly 
incentivized to focus on cutting costs through standardized or 
customized transactional products rather than creating more 
innovation provisions.56 
 Another benefit of standardized contract terms is the intrinsic 
value that accompanies more predictable judicial interpretation. 
Standard terms, with their widespread usage, are more likely to 
have been interpreted by a court and enforced by precedent.57 
Increased certainty regarding a term’s interpretation allows 
lawyers to better avoid and/or predict the likely outcomes of 
potential disputes.58 Such insights also create more efficient legal 
drafting, which reduces costs on the front-end stage.59 Standard 
terms reduce the need for and cost of interpretation of a provision 
in court and guard against judicial error since existing precedent is 
available to advise informal interpretation.60 Greater certainty of 
enforcement and familiarity of standard provisions also facilitates 
the assignability or liquidity of contracts.61 Contracts are generally 
considered more valuable in the market “if they can readily be 
 
 55. Id. at 187. Lawyers also collaborate across firms to produce contracts through 
organizations like the American Bar Foundation and the American Bar Association. E.g., 
Comm. on Tr. Indentures and Indenture Trs., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Model Negotiated 
Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 BUS. LAW. 1439 (2006); Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of 
the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture, et al., Am. Bar. Ass’n, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 
55 BUS. L. 1115 (2000). Some regulatory requirements also mandate disclosure of contract 
forms—under securities law, for example, Regulation S-K mandates the periodic disclosure 
of material contracts. 17 C.F.R § 229.601(b)(10) (2014). 
 56. Triantis, supra note 3, at 209; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path 
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 
WASH. U. L. REV. 347, 349 (1996) (“If one looks more closely at actual standard terms, . . . one 
finds disturbing instances of apparent suboptimality: standard terms that do not work in a 
reasonable manner; and uniformity in terms where one would expect more diversity to be 
optimal.”). 
 57. Triantis, supra note 3, at 181. 
 58. Id. at 186. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 194; see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY 158 (1936) (“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to 
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”). A “herding bias” may exist among 
lawyers due to risk aversion and the way a legal reputation is drawn primarily from 
outcomes—that is, whether or not a term gives rise to litigation or an unfavorable 
interpretation. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 56, at 355–58. 
 61. Triantis, supra note 3, at 194–95. 
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assigned or traded” to non-drafting third-parties.62 Thus,  
drafting parties who depart from standardized terms to include 
unfamiliar contract terms not only lose the benefits of network and 
learning externalities, but also discount the secondary market value 
of their contracts.63 
While standardization offers many benefits, primarily in the 
form of reliability and cost savings, it can stifle incentive among 
lawyers to develop and adopt novel contract terms.64 When 
adopted by the industry at large, standardized contract terms 
effectively “lock in market standards,” which create a form of path 
dependency.65 Path dependency theory suggests that the continued 
use of a certain practice occurs simply because “it is often easier or 
more cost-effective to continue along an already set path than to 
create an entirely new one.”66 Thus, a form of professional social 
pressure exists, from both clients and law firm partners, to use and 
conform to traditional terms and practices. Any lawyer who creates 
or adopts novel contract terms is likely to face industry resistance, 
as such terms require other professionals to exhaust more resources 
than would otherwise be necessary to interpret them.67 Innovators 
also risk unanticipated judicial interpretations.68 For these reasons, 
standardization of contract terms conflicts with innovation and 
furthers the industry’s already natural bias toward the status quo.69 
 
 62. Id. at 195; cf. Marc Oliver Bettzüge & Thorsten Hens, An Evolutionary Approach to 
Financial Innovation, 68 REV. ECON. STUD. 493, 505 (2001) (discussing how a particularly 
important feature of financial innovation is whether it can be standardized and traded in a 
liquid market—standardized and modular legal contracts are an example of a liquid asset). 
 63. Triantis, supra note 3, at 194; Wickelgren, supra note 13. 
 64. Triantis, supra note 3, at 209. 
 65. Id. at 192. 
 66. Caroline Banton, Path Dependency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia. 
com/terms/p/path-dependency.asp (last updated June 25, 2019). 
 67. Triantis, supra note 3, at 181; cf. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contracts as 
Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1133, 1137–38 (2006). 
 68. Triantis, supra note 3, at 194; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 67, at 1167 (proposing 
that judges interpret contracts as statutes and consider the intent of the first adopters of a 
boilerplate provision). 
 69. Triantis, supra note 3, at 182; Korobkin, supra note 13 (discussing research findings 
in which study participants favored a familiar contract term to a new one). 
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D. Limited Intellectual Property Protection 
Another obstacle to innovation is the limited intellectual 
property protection available to drafters for novel contract 
language. Fundamentally, no one can gain a monopoly over 
elementary legal words and phrases that exist in the public 
domain.70 Similarly, legal forms that borrow standard language do 
not qualify for copyright protection71 simply because of minor 
changes in syntax or the addition of a few words. Although word 
arrangements have likely been altered, they are, at best, merely a 
paraphrasing of earlier forms and there is nothing recognizably 
different from the language used before.72 Specific language of a 
contract, however, may be protected by the author’s copyright, but 
only if it is specific and original.73 Thus, “[e]ven specific, original 
language might lose its copyright if it is judicially interpreted and 
becomes part of the common law.”74 “Other expressions of the same 
idea[,]” however, are not protected under copyright law.75 
Therefore, those wishing to avoid copyright infringement can 
easily replicate innovative contract provisions by simply avoiding 
the specific language used by the original drafter.76 “Improvements 
in contract language are also difficult to protect as trade secrets 
because at least one other party—the contracting partner—has 
access to the language, and some material contracts must be 
 
 70. 2 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017 (2017 ed. 2017). “The term ‘public domain’ 
refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual property laws”—instead, 
“[t]he public owns these works, not an individual author or artist” and “[a]nyone can use a 
public domain work without obtaining permission[.]” Welcome to the Public Domain, STAN. U. 
LIBR., https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/public-domain/welcome/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2020). 
 71. “Copyright, a form of intellectual property law, protects original works of 
authorship.” Copyright in General, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/help/ 
faq/faq-general.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (emphasis added). 
 72. Triantis, supra note 3, at 195. 
 73. Id.; see also 1–2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 2.18. 
 74. Triantis, supra note 3, at 195; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Sticky Forms, Property Rights, 
and Law, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 73–74 (2011) (referencing Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 
Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 793–95 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Bldg. Officials Code Adm’rs. v. Code 
Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 731, 734–35 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
 75. Triantis, supra note 3, at 195. 
 76. See id. 
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publicly disclosed as a matter of law.”77 A debate also persists 
regarding whether contract terms can be patented.78 
Without intellectual property protection, contract innovators 
are unlikely to obtain any meaningful return (financial or 
otherwise) when deploying a term or provision in a third-party 
transaction.79 If developed at all, such terms “typically emerge at 
the []premium end” of the legal market and thereafter evolve to 
commoditized services.80 Under the current system, an upmarket 
lawyer or firm that develops novel terms cannot effectively isolate 
and realize a financial return on those terms despite taking on 
significant market risk, even if the term becomes widely adopted.81 
If one party to a transaction, for example, assumes the cost of 
developing an innovative contract provision, the non-drafting 
party would likewise receive the benefit of such without incurring 
an equivalent cost.82 Even entities who are not parties within the 
exchange can adopt the term since many material contracts are 
necessarily disclosed to the public. And since the most a firm 
developing a new term can hope for is an arguable reputational 
bump among clients and other firms, little incentive exists for it to 
innovate, unless a client is willing to a pay a premium for highly 
customized and unique work. Consequently, parties often invest as 
little as possible into contract production, which perpetuates the 
use of inefficient and increasingly archaic terms.83 
E. Market Resistance to Adopting Novel Terms 
In addition, novel contract terms rarely survive unless the 
innovator can effectively reduce the time lapse between a term’s 
creation and its adoption by the industry as a new standard. Those 
hoping for widespread adoption must develop and leverage broad 
channels to disperse the term immediately upon creation.84 Triantis 
 
 77. Id. at 196 (footnotes omitted); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2019). 
 78. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609–11 (2010). 
 79. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 195–96. 
 80. Id. at 185. See generally MAISTER, supra note 26. 
 81. Triantis, supra note 3, at 181. 
 82. Id. at 197. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 195. 
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offers the creation and deployment of the “poison pill”85 by 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz—a prominent New York law 
firm—as an example of an effective channel strategy.86 To 
effectively proliferate the provision, Wachtell undertook an 
aggressive promotional campaign to convince a broad range of 
corporate managers—many of whom were not previously clients 
of the firm—to incorporate the poison pill into their contracts. The 
law firm simultaneously reduced client skepticism of the provision 
by absorbing all of the back-end stage risk of the term and taking 
steps to ensure it would not be struck down by the courts.87 This 
approach enabled the firm to effectively realize a financial return 
on the term since its development of the poison pill generated 
additional revenue from new clients. This example, however, is 
difficult for other law firms to imitate since the organizational 
structure of Wachtell is uniquely positioned toward innovation 
rather than standardization.88 
F. Structural Features of Legal Entities 
Structural features that exist within law firms, government, and 
industry associations serve as another barrier to contract 
innovation.89 Traditional law firm practices, like hourly fee billing 
and billable hour compensation, for example, emphasize efficient 
 
 85. A “poison pill” is a contract provision designed to protect public companies from 
hostile takeovers. Marie Baca, What Is a Poison Pill?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-a-poison-pill/. 
 86. Triantis, supra note 3, at 199–200; see also “Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz, HARV. BUS. SCH. Case Study 9-496-037 (1995). Once Wachtell had successfully defended 
the poison pill in the Delaware courts, the term became quite standard in the industry. Id. 
 87. Triantis, supra note 3, at 200. 
 88. See Paul Hodkinson, Wachtell Partner: ‘We Are Not That Modern’, LAW.COM (Mar. 
25, 2019, 7:54 AM), https://www.law.com/2019/03/25/a-qa-with-wachtell-we-are-not-
that-modern-292-42566/?slreturn=20190725173253; David J. Parnell, Daniel Neff of Wachtell 
Lipton: On Leading the Market’s Most Prestigious Law Firm, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2016, 1:53 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidparnell/2016/02/24/daniel-neff-wachtell-lipton-on-
leading-most-prestigious-law-firm/#23626d547d44; Kathryn Rubino, The Key to Wachtell’s 
Success? How They Pay Their Partners, ABOVE L. (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:45 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/09/the-key-to-wachtells-success-how-they-pay-their-
partners/; Casey Sullivan, M&A Power Wachtell Could Be ‘Last True Law Partnership’, BIG L. 
BUS. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/m-a-power-wachtell-could-be-last-true-
law-partnership. 
 89. Triantis, supra note 3, at 202. 
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client service rather than innovation.90 Such emphasis prevents 
firms from investing in the very research and development that 
could lead to discovering and developing innovative transactional 
terms.91 Law firms that attempt to pursue both standardization and 
innovation are still unlikely to overcome impediments to 
innovation, since a “blurred business strategy” often threatens 
every other feature of a firm, including governance, compensation, 
and promotion.92 Organizational biases within firms may also act 
as an impediment to innovation. While law firms frequently 
succeed in hiring professionals with diverse legal skills, they often 
fall victim to the tendency of hiring individuals with profiles 
similar to those of current employees (e.g., partners hiring students 
from their alma maters).93 Hierarchy and collegiality within firms 
can also discourage individual lawyers from altering precedent 
forms of legal terms. In many cases, this is true of junior associates 
trying to avoid offending a partner who authored the provision in 
question.94 These collective realities combine to make law firms a 
relatively hostile environment for innovation.95 
Government, often through the court system and legislature, is 
an alternative source of innovation through default rules designed 
 
 90. See id. at 186. See generally William Kummel, Note, A Market Approach to Law Firm 
Economics: A New Model for Pricing, Billing, Compensation and Ownership in Corporate Legal 
Services, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 379 (1996); S. S. Samuelson & L. J. Jaffe, A Statistical Analysis of 
Law Firm Profitability, 70 B.U. L. REV. 185 (1990). 
 91. See Triantis, supra note 3, at 186. 
 92. Id. at 202. See generally MAISTER, supra note 26. 
 93. Triantis, supra note 3, at 199. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 186; see also Mark A. Cohen, Legal Change: Why Drip, Not Disruption?, FORBES 
(Apr. 26, 2018, 6:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2018/04/26/legal-
change-why-drip-not-disruption/#6a1210721fbf.  
Law firms have been slow to respond [with innovation] to changing market 
conditions for a variety of reasons, including: (1) an initial hope that the post-
recession marketplace would ‘return to normalcy’—it hasn’t and won’t; (2) their 
economic models are inimical to it; (3) an inability to raise investment capital due 
to regulatory constraints (an irony since lawyers are self-regulated); (4) lack of 
expertise in tech and process driven legal delivery and the unwillingness to accord 
it equal status with legal acumen; (5) the partnership model that ‘whacks up 
profits’ rather than re-investing them (‘short-termism’); and (6) passivity of buyers 
emanating from lawyers selling to other lawyers (that’s changing). Firms have 
made changes, but largely internal ones that sustain profit-per-partner (PPP), the 
holy grail of their metrics. 
Id. 
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to serve a broader social interest, as compared to that of private law 
firms.96 Such government entities, however, often lack the 
resources to design efficient default provisions, other than in 
circumstances where a simple rule is available that fits a wide range 
of contexts.97 As a result, default provisions are often created 
through the collaborative effort of legal practitioners, academics, 
and non-legal industry experts.98 This “public production of default 
terms,” however, has come under considerable criticism from 
academics.99 In addition, government regulators and legislators 
may also be influenced by dominant interest groups or pursue self-
serving personal agendas, both of which may distort any incentive 
to innovate.100 
In conclusion, Triantis suggests that law firms can more 
effectively respond to industry pressures and emerging 
technologies—while simultaneously overcoming the many 
impediments to contract innovation—by leveraging principles of 
modularity that improve the quality of their transactional 
services.101 This theory, however, fails to fully consider whether 
alternative methods exist for incentivizing contract innovation 
outside traditional law firms. 
IV. DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY AND SMART CONTRACTS 
Despite the barriers outlined by Triantis that prevent 
development of innovative contract terms, technologies external to 
law firms are significantly impacting the cost and quality of 
developing transactional agreements.102 One such technology is 
that of smart contracts built upon a so-called distributed ledger. 
While distributed ledger technology and smart contracts are 
 
 96. Triantis, supra note 3, at 198–99. 
 97. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 598–601 (2003). 
 98. Triantis, supra note 3, at 197–99. 
 99. Id. at 198. 
 100. Id. at 198–99. 
 101. Id. at 191–92. 
 102. Id. 
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“symbiotically linked” and often referenced synonymously, they 
are actually two distinct technologies.103 
A. Distributed Ledger Technology 
At a fundamental level, DLT is a term broadly used to describe 
any method of maintaining a distributed ledger on a network of 
computers.104 While often used interchangeably with DLT, the term 
“blockchain” is actually a sub-set of the broader technology.105 
Confusion around this distinction stems from the fact that the most 
common forms of DLT utilize the “blockchain approach,” which 
employs a chain of “blocks” to successfully provide secure and 
valid means of achieving a distributed consensus.106 Thus, a 
blockchain is only one type of data structure considered to be a 
distributed ledger.107 
A distributed ledger is a decentralized “digital record that is 
shared instantaneously across a network of participants”108 which 
aims to “establish[] consensus without the need for a centralized 
repository of information.”109 The ledger is distributed in that each 
participant (or node) in the network holds a copy of the master 
ledger.110 Whenever participants make changes to their respective 
copies, the network is notified and must agree at regular intervals 
which changes will be permanently reflected in the master 
ledger.111 Consensus techniques ensure that all network 
participants agree with the changes, which prevents the existence 
of multiple competing versions of the ledger.112 Thus, the ledger is 
decentralized, meaning there is no single administrative center for 
 
 103. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc. & Linklaters, Whitepaper: Smart Contracts 
and Distributed Ledger—A Legal Perspective 8 (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-
perspective.pdf [hereinafter ISDA & Linklaters]. 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 7, 7 n.10. 
 107. Id. at 7. 
 108. Id. at 7. 
 109. Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 318 
(2017). 
 110. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 7. 
 111. Zach Church, Blockchain, Explained, MIT SLOAN SCH. MGMT. (May 25, 2017), 
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/blockchain-explained. 
 112. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 7. 
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the network.113 Influence and ownership are shared equally 
between network participants.114 Simply put, a distributed ledger 
can be thought of as “an army of robots checking up on each others’ 
work” to achieve an optimal ledger for the network.115 The network 
effect of this technology facilitates the transfer of value between 
parties without a traditional and trusted third-party intermediary 
(e.g., banks).116 
 
Figure 1.0: Transaction Verification Through Distributed Ledger 
Technology. Derived from CBInsights.117 
 
 
 113. Lucas Mearian, What Is Blockchain? The Complete Guide, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 29, 
2019 4:13 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3191077/what-is-blockchain-
the-complete-guide.html. 
In order to move anything of value over any kind of blockchain, the network [of 
nodes] must first agree that that transaction is valid, which means no single entity 
can go in and say one way or the other whether or not a transaction happened. . . . 
To hack it, you wouldn’t just have to hack one system like in a bank . . . , you’d 
have to hack every single computer on that network, which is fighting against you 
doing that. 
Id. 
 114. Id.; see infra Figure 1.0. 
 115. Rob Marvin, Blockchain in 2017: The Year of Smart Contracts, PC MAG.  
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.pcmag.com/article/350088/blockchain-in-2017-the-year-of-
smart-contracts. 
 116. Simon J.D. Schillebeeckx, Miguel Soriano & Ernie G.S. Teo, Sing. Mgmt. Univ.,  
Blockchain and Smart Contracts: Industry Roundtable Discussion Paper 6 (June 29, 2016), 
https://www.smu.edu.sg/sites/business.smu.edu.sg/files/business/Strategy_Organisati
on/BlockChainReport_2016_02_highres.pdf [hereinafter Sing. Mgmt. Univ.]. 
 117.  This figure is derived from What Is Blockchain Technology?, CBINSIGHTS (Sept. 11, 
2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/what-is-blockchain-technology/. 
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Notably, distributed ledgers have the capacity to be either 
public or private.118 Many popular distributed ledgers (e.g., the 
blockchain supporting Bitcoin) are considered public or 
permissionless, which means anyone from the public domain can 
see its data and participate in the network.119 In the true spirit of 
DLT, no participant within the public network has “super-
administrator-type rights.”120 However, most work in the financial 
and professional services industries that leverage the technology is 
conducted on private or permissioned networks.121 Participation in 
these networks is, of course, limited to relevant contributors, 
regulators, and parties to the transactions.122 While copies of the 
ledger are still distributed within the network, private ledgers 
introduce a degree of centralization by granting “some override or 
super-administrator-type rights” to a single entity or group of 
entities over how the distributed ledger operates.123 The 
privatization of distributed ledgers is essential to draw commercial 
parties to the technology considering the confidential and sensitive 
nature of their information and data.124 
B. Smart Contracts 
With a distributed ledger serving as the platform upon which 
smart contracts are hosted and executed, a smart contract can be 
thought of as an automated and self-executed (and therefore self-
enforced) agreement dictated by a predetermined set of conditional 
actions.125 Like the technology upon which it is built, smart 
contracts are designed to enable parties to conduct transactions 
without the need for a middleman.126 The term “smart contract” 
was introduced by Nick Szabo in 1996 when he described it as “a 
set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols 
 
 118. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Raskin, supra note 109, at 306, 306 n.1. 
 126. Sing. Mgmt. Inst., supra note 116, at 6. 
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within which the parties perform on these promises.”127 Szabo 
analogizes the self-executing nature of smart contracts with the 
operation of a common vending machine.128 Vending machines are 
designed to automatically dispense selected products when 
customers insert the amount of money required to purchase the 
product.129 Upon “unilateral acceptance” by the customer in the 
form of inserted money, these machines complete their side of the 
contract automatically.130 This example captures the essence of 
what a smart contract is and does. 
Since Szabo’s introduction of the term, however, the technology 
surrounding smart contracts has evolved considerably. As a result, 
there are now many competing definitions for a smart contract.131 
Technologists, for example, think of smart contracts more as the 
computer code that enables the contract.132 Whereas attorneys think 
of smart contracts more as the obligations assumed by each party 
to the smart contract.133 In an opinion piece, attorney Joshua Stark 
articulates two competing definitions for a smart contract, which 
could more accurately be thought of as complementary 
components within a smart contract: (1) “smart contract code”—
computer code that is stored on the distributed ledger and 
“designed to self-execute certain tasks if pre-defined conditions are 
met”; and (2) “smart legal contracts”—digital contracts (designed 
either to complement or entirely substitute natural language 
agreements) with the potential of “creating legally enforceable 
rights” that are executed by software embedded with smart 
contract code.134 In other words, a smart legal contract always 
contains at least one piece of smart contract code, but not all pieces 
of smart contract code equate to a smart legal contract.135 Smart 
 
 127. Smart Contracts All. & Deloitte, Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases for Business and 
Beyond 8 (Dec. 2016), http://digitalchamber.org/assets/smart-contracts-12-use-cases-for-
business-and-beyond.pdf. 
 128. Id. at 3. 
 129. Raskin, supra note 109, at 306, 314. 
 130. Id. at 314. 
 131. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 4. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 5; see also Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK 
(June 4, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts. 
 135. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 5. 
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legal contracts mimic the structure of natural language agreements 
since they rely largely upon modular-coded units.136  
 
Figure 2.0: Comparison of Contract Modularity 
Distinguishing these two components helps avoid confusion 
but unfortunately provides no universal definition of a smart 
contract.137 One definition that does appear broad enough to 
capture both components was presented by Clack, Bakshi, and 
Braine: “A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable 
agreement. Automatable by computer, although some parts may 
require human input and control. Enforceable either by legal 
enforcement of rights and obligations or via tamper-proof 
execution of computer code.”138 
C. Benefits of Smart Contracts 
Given their broad application, smart contracts offer several 
advantages over traditional natural language agreements. Some 
proponents focus primarily on the ability to reduce transaction 
costs.139 Others emphasize the potential for increased efficiency 
among parties to the transactions and the lawyers who assist 
 
 136. See Figure 2.0. 
 137. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 5. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Raskin, supra note 109, at 309. 
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them.140 Perhaps the most compelling benefit of the technology, 
however, are the promises of reduced contract ambiguity and more 
certain outcomes. Though similar to the vending machine example 
outlined in section IV.B, smart contracts are significantly more 
powerful. A smart contract, for example, can support the execution 
of multiple transactions at any given moment, whereas a vending 
machine is only capable of supporting a single transaction.141 The 
technology also has the potential to prevent the hassle and expense 
of contract breaches, which effectively eliminates the need for third-
party enforcement.142 
Either party to a natural language agreement may voluntarily 
breach at any time. Parties to a smart contract, however, are 
prevented from such voluntary breach since their transaction is 
designed to self-execute upon the occurrence of a designated 
event.143 Thus, the self-executing nature of a smart contract 
effectively eliminates the need for a third-party enforcer since no 
breach is ever allowed to occur in the first place.144 Additionally, 
there is also far less potential for ambiguity in computer 
programming code—which is the basis for smart contracts—than 
there is in words that comprise natural language agreements.145 
These and other benefits associated with smart contracts suggest 
that adopting the technology may be one solution for law firms 
seeking to conform to the pressures facing the legal industry. 
D. Drawbacks of Smart Contracts 
Despite these apparent benefits, however, smart contracts are 
not a perfect solution and come with their own set of limitations 
 
 140. See id. at 319; James Bellamy & Chris Hill, Can the Blockchain Make Our Contracts 
Smarter?, 21 No. 11 CYBERSPACE L. NL 2 (2016). 
 141. ISDA & Linklaters, supra note 103, at 6. 
 142. Michael Bacina, Smart Contracts and Contract Disputes, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@MikeBacina/smart-contracts-and-contract-disputes-4f277ae0b556. 
“Blockchain . . . instantly reduces the workload needed for a party to prepare[] for 
enforcement of a breach of contract, and may lead to many disputes never reaching the 
lawyers in the case of self enforcing smart contracts or records which can’t be disputed.” Id. 
 143. Raskin, supra note 109, at 309; ISDA & Linklater, supra note 103, at 9. 
 144. ISDA & Linklater, supra note 103, at 9. 
 145. Raskin, supra note 109, at 324. There is less ambiguity in computer code since it is 
“more robotic than human interpretation, given its reliance on specified rules that limit term 
recognition.” Id. at 324, 326. 
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and drawbacks.146 Contrary to common perception, smart legal 
contracts (with their embedded smart contract code) rarely exist 
independent of natural language agreements.147 This is largely 
because smart contract code is often an inadequate or ineffective 
way to convey complex legal language.148 So the vast majority of 
commercial agreements continue to be comprised of boilerplate 
terms and clauses designed to guard against liability.149 As a result, 
smart legal contracts are unlikely to ever fully replace natural 
language agreements, as they are not ideally suited for every 
business transaction.150 Natural language agreements, more likely 
than not, will continue to exist and evolve as a combination of both 
natural legal language and computer code.151 
For example, Stark provides a use case of how a supplier and 
distributor could enter into a contract for goods and capture the 
payment terms in smart contract code designed to automatically 
execute upon delivery of those goods.152 While the delivery of 
goods and amount due are straightforward enough terms to be 
captured in smart contract code, other terms may be too 
ambiguous. If the distributor, for instance, desired compensation 
 
 146. Raskin, supra note 109, at 309; Karen Lewis, Blockchain: Four Use Cases Transforming 
Business, IBM: INTERNET OF THINGS BLOG (May 25, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/ 
internet-of-things/iot-blockchain-use-cases/. 
 147. Eliza Mik, Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World 
Complexity, 9 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 269, 285 (2017). 
 148. Stark, supra note 134; see also Mik, supra note 147. 
At present, the input parameters and the execution steps for a smart contract need 
to be specific and objective. In other words, if ‘x’ occurs, then execute step ‘y.’ 
Therefore, the actual tasks that smart contracts are performing are fairly 
rudimentary . . . . Smart contracts are presently best suited to execute 
automatically two types of ‘transactions’ found in many contracts: (1) ensuring the 
payment of funds upon certain triggering events and (2) imposing financial 
penalties if certain objective conditions are not satisfied. In each case, human 
intervention, including through a trusted escrow holder or even the judicial 
system, is not required once the smart contract has been deployed and is 
operational, thereby reducing the execution and enforcement costs of the 
contracting process. 
Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Potential and 
Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-and-
their-potential-and-inherent-limitations/. 
 149. Stark, supra note 134. 
 150. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140. 
 151. Stark, supra note 134. 
 152. Id. 
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from the supplier for any defective products received, a natural 
language agreement would likely be required since identifying 
defective goods requires human judgment that goes beyond the 
simplistic nature of computer code.153 Despite the difference in 
form, these two contracting techniques—smart contract code and 
natural language agreements—may effectively coexist as part of a 
blended legal contract.154 
 
Figure 3.0: Blended Legal Contract 
Significant issues also surround the efficacy and 
implementation of smart legal contracts.155 Fundamental contract 
law, for example, still requires that an offer be “clearly and 
unambiguously accepted,” even if a smart legal contract is 
technically capable of self-executing.156 Thus, attorneys utilizing 
smart legal contracts must ensure parties satisfy all requirements 
needed to form a valid contract.157 Similarly, smart legal contracts 
pose the challenge of how to effectively resolve desired 
modifications to the agreement.158 The execution of an intended 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.; see infra Figure 3.0. 
 155. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Raskin, supra note 109, at 326. 
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smart legal contract depends entirely upon the accuracy of the 
smart contract code embedded within it.159 Rectifying errors in such 
a contract may prove challenging, especially if such errors are 
discovered after the contract has already self-executed.160 Smart 
legal contracts may also require at least some level of “active 
monitoring” to ensure both parties fulfill their legal obligations.161 
Another issue associated with smart legal contracts is that of 
information confidentiality and security for both public and private 
distributed ledgers.162 The public nature of traditional distributed 
ledgers may discourage commercial adaptation of the platform 
entirely, unless a private ledger is utilized with stricter controls 
over user access.163 Yet, even private distributed ledgers operated 
by third-parties should be carefully evaluated to ensure the 
existence of proper confidentiality provisions.164 Even with these 
precautions, entities leveraging the technology may still be subject 
to large-scale data and information breaches, which often occur 
unexpectedly and even among some of the most robust and  
well-designed platforms.165 This is especially true of private 
distributed ledgers since they forgo a primary benefit of the 
technology—that is, an open-source platform that allows and 
encourages experts to inspect and resolve flaws and vulnerabilities 
in the computer code.166 
Despite these apparent drawbacks, economists still view smart 
contracts and DLT as “a general-purpose technology,” which 
means their implementation will likely still result in a variety of 
applications that affect nearly every industry vertical.167 While the 
technology has endless applications, the most germane use cases 
 
 159. Mimi Zou, Grace Cheng & Marta Soria Heredia, In Code We Trust? Trustlessness 
and Smart Contracts, SCL (Apr. 1, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.scl.org/articles/10493-in-
code-we-trust-trustlessness-and-smart-contracts. 
 160. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Haseeb Qureshi, A Hacker Stole $31M of Ether—How It Happened, and What It Means 
for Ethereum, FREECODECAMP (July 20, 2017), https://medium.freecodecamp.org/a-hacker-
stole-31m-of-ether-how-it-happened-and-what-it-means-for-ethereum-9e5dc29e33ce. 
 166. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140. 
 167. Church, supra note 111. 
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appear to be those that involve “straightforward clauses” with 
“clearly defined outcomes.”168 For these types of contractual 
arrangements, smart contracts and DLT have the capacity to 
effectively replace much of the routine work currently conducted 
by transactional lawyers across the three stages of contracting. 
Though greater efficiencies and reduced costs make the 
technology attractive to legal professionals, understandable 
skepticism continues to impede its widespread adoption by the 
industry. The still early and untested nature of smart contracts and 
DLT continues to drive most transactional lawyers—who are 
primarily responsible for facilitating secure and predictable 
transfers of value—to continue their reliance upon paper-based 
natural language agreements.169 In addition, the same barriers that 
impede innovation in the drafting of natural language agreements 
also deter lawyers from innovating through smart contracts and 
DLT. These barriers include standardization of contract terms, 
limited intellectual property protection, market resistance to 
adopting novel terms, and structural features of legal entities. Thus, 
a total and immediate shift toward the technology remains 
unlikely. These realities coupled with the other obstacles identified 
by Triantis will likely impede contract innovation in the traditional 
law firm model. 
V. CAPTURING GREATER RETURNS, PLATFORM DOMINANCE  
& BLOCKCHAIN LOCK-IN 
While the legal profession appears hesitant to completely 
integrate smart contracts and DLT, commercial entities are actively 
seeking the benefits of their adoption and implementation. Many 
of these entities have created DLT systems that allow others to 
capture operational value by uploading their data, which can 
subsequently be analyzed and leveraged to develop efficient 
business transactions through smart contracts. Such systems have 
 
 168. John Ream, Yang Chu & David Schatsky, Upgrading Blockchains: Smart Contract Use 
Cases in Industry, DELOITTE: DELOITTE INSIGHTS (June 8, 2016), https://www2.deloitte. 
com/insights/us/en/focus/signals-for-strategists/using-blockchain-for-smart-
contracts.html. 
 169. Dan Puterbaugh, The Future of Contracts: Automation, Blockchain, and Smart 
Contracts, ACC DOCKET, Dec. 2016, at 48, 50. 
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the potential to serve as “an entirely different platform”—outside 
of the traditional legal model—for parties to create and enforce 
agreements.170 Such alternative contracting platforms could 
effectively reduce and/or eliminate a client’s need for a 
transactional lawyer in the drafting of traditional natural language 
agreements. As a result, large commercial entities are likely in the 
strongest position to capture financial returns from contract 
innovation and the development of such platforms since their 
business models inherently insulate such returns from 
competitors.171 Thus, commercial entities utilizing DLT and smart 
contracts may be more effective engines of innovation than law 
firms that simply leverage tools of modularity. 
Traditional law firms, as noted above, often struggle to capture 
returns from novel contract provisions because the value of textual 
legal language is instantly shared with both parties to the contract 
and sometimes with the public at large.172 In contrast, contract 
innovations developed by a commercial entity with a DLT platform 
often take a different form than mere textual language. Since these 
platforms utilize smart contract technology, innovation to their 
contracts usually occurs through smart contract code. Using a 
customer’s data, for example, an entity could create a series of 
smart legal contracts that automate various transactions within a 
customer’s supply chain. Over time, that entity would likely 
develop more efficient ways to manage the customer’s supply 
chain, which would result in the creation of an increasingly robust 
mega-contract—that is, a series of interconnected smart legal 
contracts—for the customer. Unlike textual legal language, such 
innovation is not immediately accessible by competitors since no 
single contracting party to the transaction has visibility of the smart 
contract code for the customer’s entire mega-contract. Rather, a 
contracting party to a smart legal contract would only have 
visibility into the smart contract code of the individual transaction 
to which they are a party. The contracting party would not, 
however, have access to the customer’s other interconnected smart 
 
 170. Matthew Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71,  
80 (2018). 
 171. Triantis, supra note 3, at 196. 
 172. Id. at 197. 
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legal contracts, which interconnectivity is ultimately the innovation 
that commercial entities are offering. Therefore, even without 
intellectual property rights, commercial entities are better 
positioned to protect such innovation from competition. 
Commercial entities also benefit directly from developing such 
robust contracts over time for individual customers. Customers 
that capture efficiencies and cost savings through the technology 
are more likely to increase their usage. As a customer increases  
the amount of data managed on an entity’s DLT platform, they 
naturally become more dependent upon that entity. Such 
dependency drives customer loyalty and lock-in to the  
entity’s blockchain. By that point, the cost and time required  
to subsequently switch an entire contracted supply chain to  
another provider is so exorbitant that such a transition is  
simply unreasonable.  
Perhaps even more valuable than the lock-in of individual 
customers is an entity’s ability to leverage and apply learnings from 
previously developed smart contracts. When an entity develops an 
innovative smart contract for one customer, the computer code 
belongs to the entity. As a result, the entity can immediately reuse 
the existing code as a model for other customers with similar 
transactional needs. This strategy mimics the use of standardized 
contract terms deployed by traditional law firms. Just as legal 
professionals store documents and terms from prior transactions 
for future use, commercial entities with DLT platforms effectively 
do the same with the smart contracts they develop. Such 
standardization benefits the commercial entity by establishing 
procedural best practices that capture efficiencies and reduce cost.  
Standardization deployed by commercial entities is further 
supported by another strategy from the legal profession: contract 
modularity. Like the text within a natural language agreement, 
smart contract code is capable of being independently created and 
subsequently separated or combined without compromising the 
completeness of the entire smart legal contract. Such modularity 
further reduces costs for the commercial entity because it allows a 
team of programmers to divide and allocate components of the 
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smart contract code, which facilitates independent and 
simultaneous creation that can ultimately be combined.173 
Though similarities certainly exist between the deployment of 
standardized legal language and standardized smart contract code, 
there is a key difference worth noting. An important benefit of 
standardized legal language is the intrinsic value of predictable 
judicial interpretation. To be achieved, however, this benefit 
requires widespread use of a standardized provision among legal 
professionals in the industry. Such broad usage increases the 
likelihood that a court will have interpreted the provision and that 
the interpretation will be reinforced by precedent. Consequently, 
legal professionals that abandon standardized provisions take on 
unnecessary risk, while simultaneously losing network benefits.174 
Smart legal contracts, on the other hand, are designed to be self-
executing and self-enforcing. Since these contracts make it more 
difficult to breach the agreement, there is often less need for judicial 
interpretation and therefore less incentive among commercial 
entities to standardize innovations for predictable interpretation. 
This important difference reinforces both the ability of commercial 
entities to insulate contract innovation and their incentives to do so. 
VI. CASE STUDY: IBM 
International Business Machines Corporation’s (IBM) 
application of DLT illustrates how this alternative approach to 
incentivizing contract innovation may better position commercial 
entities, rather than law firms, to protect innovation from 
competitors. As a global technology company with a broad range 
of cloud-based solutions and business consulting services, IBM 
maintains a diverse portfolio of products and services, including 
cloud computing, cognitive computing, commerce, data and 
analytics, Internet of Things (IoT), IT infrastructure, mobile, and 
security.175 More specifically, IBM is attempting to unlock the 
potential of DLT by making the technology more accessible to its 
 
 173. Id. at 191. 
 174. Id. at 194–95. 
 175. Watson (Computer), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watson_ 
(computer) (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
004.NASH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:06 PM 




business clients through its Watson Platform and Blockchain.176 
While perhaps the most notable usage scenarios of DLT involve the 
financial sector, the technology has broad application to IoT 
solutions, which IBM is attempting to leverage.177 
A. IBM Watson IoT Platform 
Launched in 2011, the IBM Watson Platform is an artificial 
intelligence program that uses natural language processing and 
machine learning to mine and classify insights from large amounts 
of unstructured data in a short period of time.178 A subset of this 
technology is the Watson IoT Platform, which unites artificial 
intelligence with IoT to improve efficiency and productivity for 
IBM’s business clients.179 Broadly speaking, IoT allows a variety of 
objects to be sensed or controlled remotely across an existing 
network infrastructure.180 This network creates opportunities for 
more direct integration of the physical world into computer-based 
systems, which drives improved efficiency, accuracy, and 
economic benefit through reduced human intervention.181 Despite 
its relatively new presence in the market, Watson IoT has already 
developed a strong customer base.182 Currently, IBM incentivizes 
customers to join its platform by offering free and open access to 
Watson IoT and its accompanying development capabilities.183 
 
 176. See generally MANAV GUPTA, BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES: IBM LIMITED  
EDITION (2017). 
 177. Amitranjan Gantait, Joy Patra & Ayan Mukherjee, Integrate Device Data with Smart 
Contracts in IBM Blockchain, IBM: IBM DEVELOPER (June 1, 2017), https://developer. 
ibm.com/articles/cl-blockchain-for-cognitive-iot-apps-trs/. 
 178. Watson (Computer), supra note 175. 
 179. Aditya Kaul, IBM Watson IoT and Its Integration with Blockchain, TRACTICA (Aug. 1, 
2016), https://www.tractica.com/automation-robotics/ibm-watson-iot-and-its-integration-
with-blockchain/. 
 180. Watson Internet of Things—What Is the IoT?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/internet-
of-things/learn/what-is-iot/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020); Internet of Things, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_things (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). An “object” 
in the context of the Internet of Things is any item connected to the Internet capable of 
collecting and transferring information over a network without human assistance. Id. 
 181. Internet of Things, supra note 180. 
 182. Kaul, supra note 179. Watson IoT customers include: airlines, car manufacturers, 
telecom companies, etc. Id. 
 183. IBM Named an Internet of Things Software Platform Leader, Launches Global Watson IoT 
Consulting Solutions, IBM (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/ 
pressrelease/51089.wss. 
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IBM’s objective is that customers—once they begin realizing 
benefits from the technology—will add additional data to the 
platform and eventually become a paying customer willing to 
expand their free prototypes into larger scale production.184 
B. IBM Blockchain 
Watson IoT recently integrated with the IBM Blockchain, which 
serves as the company’s DLT platform that facilitates transactions 
between parties.185 This integration allows the connected IoT 
devices of business clients to interact with one another and send 
any relevant interactions or collected data to private distributed 
ledgers within the IBM network.186 Data gathered from those 
devices can be monitored and analyzed for business intelligence, 
then utilized to create smart contracts.187 Smart contracts update 
and validate the data sent to the distributed ledger and 
subsequently deliver it to all interested participants in the business 
network.188 All business partners have a record of each transaction, 
effectively preventing disputes and ensuring each partner is held 
accountable for their individual roles in the overall transaction. 
Such decentralized integration effectively reduces the need for 
human monitoring and improves the security of IoT solutions by 
implementing specific consensus mechanisms that guard against 
compromised devices.189 
C. IBM Integration of Watson IoT & Blockchain 
By integrating Watson IoT with IBM Blockchain, the company 
attempts to lock-in customers to its broader business ecosystem to 
capture value.190 Initially free of charge, potential customers link 
IoT devices and data to Watson IoT to manage their information. 
These entities often become paying customers once they realize the 
added benefits of incorporating their data with the rest of the IBM 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Kaul, supra note 179. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Gantait et al., supra note 177. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See infra Figure 4.0. 
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platform (e.g., increased accuracy and efficiency through a more 
transparent shipping process). When a customer makes this 
transition, IBM effectively reconfigures the customer’s supply 
chain through its Blockchain. In other words, the integrated 
technologies enable IBM employees to design contractual 
relationships for customers using smart contract code—which has 
the potential to drastically reduce a customer’s need for natural 
language agreements through lawyers. Customers, in turn, achieve 
inexpensive ongoing management and execution of highly specific 
and mundane transaction obligations. 
IBM creates value for customers by providing contract 
maintenance and improvement, and captures financial returns for 
these efforts through an ongoing management fee. These 
innovative contract improvements—achieved primarily through 
more efficient or effective smart contract code—are insulated from 
competitors, which makes IBM the exclusive beneficiary of such 
developments. As more information is linked to the IBM platform, 
customers increase in loyalty, which often lengthens the paid 
business relationship between the customer and IBM. The company 
also realizes returns by leveraging and applying intelligence from 
previously developed smart legal contracts (e.g., reusing existing 
smart contract code as a model) across multiple contracts and 
customers with similar transactional needs. Such versatile 
applications of contract innovations not only allocate costs across a 
range of customers but also reduce contract production time. Faster 
production time enables IBM to more quickly and easily create 
value for new customers, which attracts and incentivizes even more 
customers to join the platform. These realities place commercial 
entities, like IBM, in an optimal position to capture value and 
achieve financial returns from contract innovation. 
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Figure 4.0: Device Integration with IBM Watson IoT & IBM 
Blockchain. Derived from: Tractica & IBM 
D. IBM Integration with GitHub 
A similar, but alternative, avenue IBM uses to introduce 
potential customers to its propriety platform is GitHub, a 
community repository for open-source computer code.191 IBM has 
developed and made available a series of sample distributed ledger 
contracts on GitHub. These sample contracts are freely accessible to 
the public and currently organized by and limited to a discrete 
number of industry use cases (e.g., aviation supply chain sample 
contract). In addition, the open-source community nature of 
GitHub allows individuals to contribute to the sample contracts, 
which may further enrich and optimize their effectiveness. IBM 
intends these sample contracts to be an introductory resource for 
potential customers looking to begin blockchain development and 
integration with Watson IoT. The company’s ultimate objective, 
however, is to transition non-paying users of these bare-bone 
samples to paying customers on IBM’s private platform, which 
offers far more applicable and customizable smart contracts. While, 
in theory, any IBM competitor could easily view and mimic the 
sample contracts on GitHub, such access is of no concern to IBM—
the true proprietary information is the way in which IBM links 
 
 191. GitHub, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GitHub (last visited Feb.  
13, 2020). 
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multiple smart legal contracts together, effectively enabling its 
customers to reduce mundane transaction costs and gain large-
scale market efficiencies. Accordingly, a small selection of sample 
contracts in the hands of an IBM competitor is simply an 
insufficient amount of information to pose any real threat to the 
proprietary nature of the company’s services. Thus, the sample 
contracts made available on GitHub likely stand as an effective 
customer acquisition tool for IBM’s proprietary platform. 
VII. DO PROPRIETARY CONTRACT PLATFORMS  
PROMOTE CONSUMER WELFARE? 
Of course, the technology solutions offered by IBM and other 
commercial entities cannot possibly address all transactional needs 
of customers. Still, their solutions are incredibly effective at 
managing mundane transactions and, therefore, are likely to have 
a positive influence on consumer welfare. More efficient 
contracting, for example, reduces transactional costs between 
entities, which may result in more accessible and lower priced 
products and services for end customers.192 Less expensive contract 
production coupled with greater efficiency in development and 
management makes the technology an attractive supplement to—
or even replacement for—the role of transactional law firms. With 
blockchain to manage their mundane transactions, customers 
utilizing these solutions no longer have the same need for a 
transactional lawyer to complete such work. Instead, customers are 
likely to turn to transactional law firms only for highly technical or 
complex transactions not easily addressed through a developed 
blockchain (i.e., those that require more senior and experienced 
partner hours). Collectively, these realities are likely to make legal 
services more affordable to the public at large. 
The technology also addresses the burden of government 
regulation, which is often a significant barrier to market efficiency. 
Embedded trust and transparency within smart legal contracts will 
likely reduce current market dependency on regulation. Smart 
legal contracts make it more difficult for entities to breach; thus, 
 
 192. Bellamy & Hill, supra note 140. 
004.NASH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:06 PM 




their increased use could reduce the amount of resulting litigation 
in the court system.  
For legal professionals, the impact of the technology may 
appear less beneficial or even threatening to the industry’s current 
model. Traditional law firms generate revenue by billing clients by 
the hour. As such, greater efficiencies achieved through smart legal 
contracts may diminish the number of hours a firm bills its clients. 
Lower billable hours per client, however, could potentially be offset 
if firms increase the number of clients they serve. Either way, 
reduced customer reliance upon firms for mundane transactions 
poses an interesting conundrum for the role junior transactional 
lawyers will play in a firm. Since mundane transactional work is 
often assigned to junior lawyers—both to train them in the art and 
allow more experienced lawyers to focus time on the more 
challenging transactions—their role is potentially threatened if 
such work shifts away from law firms and toward commercial 
entities. Without access to mundane or “training wheels” work, 
junior lawyers may have a difficult time obtaining the experience 
necessary to support customers in complex transactions later in 
their career. Regardless, customers will no doubt come to expect 
that law firms nevertheless retain the expertise and knowledge to 
help develop contracts around new or existing blockchain 
infrastructures.193 Thus, law firms familiar with the technology will 
be best positioned, at least in the short-term, to serve client needs 
and adjust their business models to address the changing 
technological landscape.194 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Though few legal professionals seem concerned about 
maintaining or improving the quality of transactional legal 
services, Triantis concludes that an emphasis on innovation that 
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improves contract quality—rather than simply reducing costs—
will help lawyers more effectively adapt to industry cost pressure 
and emerging technologies.195 Yet, any law firm that wishes to 
pursue such innovation will likely be hindered by significant 
barriers in the legal industry—namely, the customary deployment 
of standardized, unchanging contract terms, the limited intellectual 
property protection available to drafters of novel contract 
language, market resistance to the adoption of novel terms, and 
structural features of legal entities that value client service over 
innovation. Amidst these barriers, Triantis posits that perhaps the 
only effective way for law firms to incentivize contract innovation 
is through collaborative contract design strategies like 
standardization and modularity.196 However, even these proposed 
strategies are unlikely to successfully incentivize law firms to 
innovate since they fail to assist firms in capturing and preserving 
the financial returns of any innovation. 
In contrast to traditional law firms, commercial entities 
leveraging DLT and smart contracts are likely in a stronger position 
to capture financial returns from contract innovation. As the IBM 
case study illustrates, the business models of such entities 
inherently insulate returns from competitors in a way that 
eliminates many of the innovation barriers found in the legal 
industry. The emergence of this alternative channel for legal 
contract innovation suggests that, perhaps, Triantis’ concerns 
regarding a lack of innovation incentives are overstated. Rather 
than seek to overcome the innovation barriers that persist in an age-
old industry, legal entities are likely to be more effective in contract 
innovation efforts if they leverage technologies external to the legal 
industry altogether. At first glance, this hypothesis may appear to 
threaten the current legal model by reducing reliance among 
contracting parties upon traditional transactional lawyers. Yet, the 
technology solutions of IBM and other commercial entities are only 
a practical threat to the more mundane and simplistic contracts 
currently provided by law firms. Instead of outright replacing legal 
services, DLT and smart contract technology will more realistically 
 
 195. Triantis, supra note 3, at 179–80; see also HARVARD LAW TODAY, supra note 4. 
 196. Triantis, supra note 3, at 202–04; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 286–92. 
004.NASH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/20  9:06 PM 




serve as a supplement to the industry. Supplementing traditional 
legal services with these technologies will ultimately facilitate less 
expensive contract production, effectively promoting consumer 
welfare through more efficient contract enforcement, which is 
essential to long-term economic growth and development. 
Erika J. Nash* 
  
 
  *  J.D., Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School. 
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